Apple’s iPad Officially Passes the Higher Education Test
Apple’s iPad received glowing marks for its performance in college classrooms from the eagerly anticipated Reed College evaluation, according to a new report shared with Fast Company. The iPad’s smooth interface kept up with the lighting-quick pace of college lectures, helping it to overcome the very same gauntlet that killed the Kindle’s hope of education dominance a year earlier. Most importantly, the report predicts an explosion of opportunity for both Apple software developers and tablet competitors.
After extensive student interviews throughout the Fall 2010 semester, “The bottom line feeling was that the Amazon Kindle DX was not adequate for use in a higher education curricular setting,” Chief Technology Officer Martin Ringle tells Fast Company. “The bottom line for the iPad was exactly the opposite.”
» via Fast Company
I’ve been wanting to get this up all day.
First, here’s to all of God’s workers. You know who you are. Your just reward awaits.

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More importantly, John Cassidy (New Yorker) had a great Rational Irrationality piece today. In full below…..
Contrary to appearances, I’m not obsessed with Goldman Sachs, and this will be my last post on the subject for a while. But the Wall Street firm issued its latest profit report today, and I thought it would be interesting to compare its results to those of Apple, another iconic American business, which yesterday published its own profit figures.
Many people are put off by financial accounts, but they provide an invaluable window into what is really going on in a given corporation, and to how much it is contributing to society. I may be weird, but sometimes I actually like poking around in 10-Qs, 8-Ks, and other disclosure forms that public companies have to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. One word of warning, though. What follows should be considered a process of me thinking out loud, and pointing out some things that strike me, rather than reaching any definitive conclusions.
As everybody knows, Goldman and Apple are both making tons of money (although Goldman’s latest results disappointed investors somewhat). In the final quarter of 2010, the bank generated net profits of $2.39 billion on revenues of $8.64 billion. Apple, which has a much bigger turnover, made profits of $6 billion on revenues of $26.4 billion.
On Wall Street and in the computer industry, quarterly profits tend to bounce around a bit, so it is perhaps more illuminating to look at the entirety of 2010. With Goldman, whose fiscal year follows the calendar, this is easy. In the past twelve months, Goldman recorded net profits of $8.35 billion on revenues of $39.16 billion. Apple’s financial year ends in September, but by combining the results from its first fiscal quarter of 2011, which has just ended, and the final three quarters of 2010, I came up with the following figures. Apple made $17.63 billion on revenues of $76.28 billion.
On the face of it, the two firms’ profit margins seem pretty similar. For every dollar of revenue it generates, Goldman makes a profit of about twenty-one cents; Apple makes about twenty-three cents. But that is where the comparisons end. From an economic perspective, the real measure of a business is the return it generates on the capital it employs, which could be used in alternative projects. By this metric, Apple leaves Goldman far behind.
One popular measure of capital is “shareholders’ equity,” which consists largely of money invested in the firm and retained earnings. Wall Street analysts tend to fixate on return on equity (ROE), but it can be a misleading, especially when applied blindly to financial institutions. In good times, banks can increase their ROE simply by taking on more leverage (borrowing). Until the fall of 2008, this was precisely the strategy that Goldman and its rivals pursued: in the boom years, Goldman often generated a return on ROE of more than twenty per cent, but this wasn’t sustainable. When the credit bubble burst, high levels of leverage destroyed some banks and forced others into the arms of the government. In effect if not intention, the banks had been creating fictitious profits, much of which ultimately ended up as losses.
During the past couple of years, the banks, Goldman included, have cut their leverage ratios sharply, partly by issuing more equity to shareholders, partly by selling assets and paying down debts. As a result, we now have a more realistic estimate of their earnings power. Despite its return to profitability in 2009 and 2010, Goldman’s ROE last year was just 11.5 per cent. Apple, by contrast, generated a ROE of about thirty-two per cent in 2010, almost three times the Goldman figure.
Another way to gauge a firm’s performance is to take everything it possesses—its buildings, its machinery and other equipment, its product designs, and its financial holdings—and look at how much profit it generates for each dollar of assets on its books. In my opinion, this measure, which is known as return on assets (ROA), is the best way to judge a business, because it excludes the amplifying effect of leverage. Now let’s apply it to Goldman and Apple.
According to its latest filing with the S.E.C., Goldman ended 2010 with assets of $911 billion, which means its ROA for the year was roughly .91 per cent. (Yes, that is less than one per cent.) Apple ended 2010 with total assets of $86.7 billion, which means it generated an ROA of about 20.3 per cent.
To summarize: Apple isn’t merely generating a higher return on the capital it employs than Goldman; it is more than twenty times as profitable! How can this be?
Part of the answer is an accounting foible. Unlike some corporations, Apple doesn’t record on its balance sheet much of the value of its patents and other intellectual property—the look and feel of the iPad, for example. If it did this, the figure for total assets recorded on its books would be considerably higher, and its ROA would be lower. But accounting is only a small part of the story. (As far as I know, Goldman doesn’t capitalize its intellectual capital, such as it is, either.)
The main reason why Apple is so much more profitable than Goldman is a reassuring one. It makes tangible things—iMacs, iPhones, iPads—that millions of people want to buy, and for which they are willing to pay a premium price. (I am writing this post on an iMac.) Despite operating in a highly competitive industry, Steve Jobs’s firm has successfully differentiated its product line to such an extent that it now has considerable monopoly power: it can charge considerably more for its gizmos that they cost to manufacture.
Goldman, for all its reputation and smarts, has no such franchise. It does some things that its clients value and are willing to pay for—making markets, raising capital, providing investment advice, hedging risky positions—but rival banks, such as JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, provide practically the same suite of services, and pricing power is limited. (Not limited enough in some areas, such as I.P.O.s.) The only way Goldman (or any other investment bank) can increase its profit margins in a big way is to leverage up its balance sheet and live by its wits in the financial markets. But when banks all try this together, the consequences are usually disastrous.
Another thing that differentiates Goldman from Apple is how much it pays its employees. In 2010, Goldman’s 35,700 employees took home an average of $430,700. Apple doesn’t publish much information about its labor costs. According to the jobs Web site Simply Hired, the average salary at Apple is $46,000. Another Web site, Salary List, quotes a substantially higher figure—$107,719—but that doesn’t appear to include people working at Apple’s more than three hundred retail stores. Whichever number is more accurate, the basic message is the same. Apple employees earn a lot less than their counterparts at Goldman despite the fact they generate a much higher return—private and social—on the capital they use.
Go figure.
If you’ve been watching Apple’s earnings over the last few years, you already knew this. But very cool to see visually. c/o Business Insider.
Steve Jobs is out sick. Again. Remember a year or two ago when Bloomberg accidentally posted his obituary? A little funny, a little weird, right? More important question- can Apple remain an innovation factory without him? I suppose we’ll find out soon.
APPLE’S REAL Earnings Expectations
Apple is known for dramatically lowballing its profit guidance, and then miraculously blowing out “expectations.”
Since Sept. 2006, Apple has topped its quarterly EPS guidance by an average 41%, and its revenue guidance by an average 9%.
So what does that mean for this quarter, which will be Tuesday afternoon?
It’s a little tricky, because Apple significantly changed its accounting practices a few quarters ago. It now recognizes iPhone revenue almost all at once, instead of spreading it over 24 months. So we won’t know reliably for a few more quarters just how much Apple is lowballing its guidance using the new numbers. (Though the last few quarters, Apple blew out its sales numbers even more than it usually does.)
But running the old formula, based on Apple’s December quarter guidance of $4.80 EPS and $23 billion in sales, history suggests Apple should report EPS of about $6.77 on $25 billion of revenue.
Wall Street expects lower earnings and revenue: Consensus stands at $5.38 of EPS on $24.4 billion of sales. So Apple is set up to once again “surprise.”
Via Silicon Alley Insider.
The iPad is Already Bigger Than the iPod, And Half As Big as the Mac
Apple’s iPad is already huge. In fact, after just its first quarter of sales, it’s already the company’s third-biggest business segment.
In the June quarter, the iPad business generated $2.2 billion of revenue for Apple.
That’s more than Apple’s iPod business generated last quarter — $1.5 billion. (Though the cheaper iPod obviously had larger unit sales.) And it’s almost half as big as Apple’s 26-year-old Mac business, which put in its best quarter ever at $4.4 billion.
Very impressive. And the fact that the iPad and Mac can apparently coexist is especially good news for Apple.
Great reporting from Wired magazine. Come to find out that wasn’t all AT&T’s fault. Apple was insufferable as well. Excerpt below. Click link for full article.
AT&T had seen something like this coming. Almost as soon as the first iPhone was introduced in 2007, the carrier realized it might run short of bandwidth. Within just a few months, the first wave of iPhone customers was already sucking down about 15 times more data than the average smartphone customer and 50 percent more than AT&T had itself projected. In a bid to avert the looming problem, a team headed by senior vice president Kris Rinne met with Apple to ask for help. Of course AT&T was planning to upgrade its network to handle the increased demand, Rinne’s team told Apple executives, but that was going to take years. In the meantime, would Apple take measures to help throttle back the traffic? Perhaps Apple could restrict its YouTube app to run only over Wi-Fi. Maybe the iPhone could feature a smaller, lower-resolution videostream or cut off YouTube videos after one minute. Rinne, who had already met with Apple’s iPhone team at least half a dozen times, fully expected the company to play along. After all, manufacturers agreed to such restrictions all the time. It didn’t make sense to build phones and offer features that carriers couldn’t support.
But in meetings with Apple engineers and marketers over the subsequent year, Rinne and other AT&T executives discovered that Apple wasn’t playing by traditional wireless rules. It wasn’t interested in cooperating, especially if it meant hobbling what had quickly become its marquee product. For Apple, the idea of restricting the iPhone was akin to asking Steve Jobs to ditch the black turtleneck. “They tried to have that conversation with us a number of times,” says someone from Apple who was in the meetings. “We consistently said ‘No, we are not going to mess up the consumer experience on the iPhone to make your network tenable.’ They’d always end up saying, ‘We’re going to have to escalate this to senior AT&T executives,’ and we always said, ‘Fine, we’ll escalate it to Steve and see who wins.’ I think history has demonstrated how that turned out.”
h/t to reader Scott. Frankly, we’re still looking to buy one. But hmmmmm.
Just another reason to look to Android as a viable competitor to RIM and Apple in the mobile marketplace.
TechCrunch:
Steve Jobs recommends getting a case for this issue, but Consumer Reports calls it a design flaw. It suggests a duct-tape fix. Already there are lawsuits brewing..
Other than the antenna problem, Consumer Reports loves the phone:
it sports the sharpest display and best video camera we’ve seen on any phone, and even outshines its high-scoring predecessors with improved battery life and such new features as a front-facing camera for video chats and a built-in gyroscope that turns the phone into a super-responsive game controller. But Apple needs to come up with a permanent—and free—fix for the antenna problem before we can recommend the iPhone 4.
It also continues to sell like crazy. So is the antenna problem real and widespread, or do people just not notice it or care because they figure it is AT&T’s fault?
iPhone 4 Reviews In: It’s Awesome.
Alamo Capital looking for a $300 (just 300, not 300MM) liquidity facility to pick up a 32GB model…..
Walt Mossberg (WSJ):
I’d say that Apple has built a beautiful smartphone that works well, adds impressive new features and is still, overall, the best device in its class.
David Pogue (NYT):
If what you care about, however, is size and shape, beauty and battery life, polish and pleasure, then the iPhone 4 is calling your name. http://nyti.ms/bycKsF
Chart above:
In researching the iPhone as a part of Critical Wayfinding, the analysis of the device, the corporation, the vast network of shareholders, technology and the distribution infrastructure that surrounds it yielded an overwhelming amount of information. In an attempt to organize this information into a format that is engaging and reflective of the wayfinding foundations of the project, two large conceptual diagrams in the style of Harry Beck’s London Underground diagram were produced. These are not maps in any conventional sense, but rather diagramatic representations of the interconnected space of technology, capital, instrumental value, exchange value, social and environmental impact that surround the device. The first diagram focuses primarily on the physical device, and the existence of the device as an object in our world. The second examines the placement of the device with respect to the individual and society. http://bit.ly/djxuyc