Watching all this stuff (Tunisia, Egypt, rioting, internet being turned off, etc) reminded me of a piece by the ever-popular Malcom Gladwell this summer. Basically, his argument is that Facebook, Twitter, an dother social media are/will be bit players at best in large scale social protest and change.
Enjoy w/your lunch. Excerpt below, full story at the link. http://nyr.kr/9Y92DZ
SMALL CHANGE
Social media can’t provide what social change has always required. At four-thirty in the afternoon on Monday, February 1, 1960, four college students sat down at the lunch counter at the Woolworth’s in downtown Greensboro, North Carolina. They were freshmen at North Carolina A. & T., a black college a mile or so away. “I’d like a cup of coffee, please,” one of the four, Ezell Blair, said to the waitress. “We don’t serve Negroes here,” she replied. The Woolworth’s lunch counter was a long L-shaped bar that could seat sixty-six people, with a standup snack bar at one end. The seats were for whites. The snack bar was for blacks. Another employee, a black woman who worked at the steam table, approached the students and tried to warn them away. “You’re acting stupid, ignorant!” she said. They didn’t move. Around five-thirty, the front doors to the store were locked. The four still didn’t move. Finally, they left by a side door. Outside, a small crowd had gathered, including a photographer from the Greensboro Record. “I’ll be back tomorrow with A. & T. College,” one of the students said. By next morning, the protest had grown to twenty-seven men and four women, most from the same dormitory as the original four. The men were dressed in suits and ties. The students had brought their schoolwork, and studied as they sat at the counter. On Wednesday, students from Greensboro’s “Negro” secondary school, Dudley High, joined in, and the number of protesters swelled to eighty. By Thursday, the protesters numbered three hundred, including three white women, from the Greensboro campus of the University of North Carolina. By Saturday, the sit-in had reached six hundred. People spilled out onto the street. White teen-agers waved Confederate flags. Someone threw a firecracker. At noon, the A. & T. football team arrived. “Here comes the wrecking crew,” one of the white students shouted. By the following Monday, sit-ins had spread to Winston-Salem, twenty-five miles away, and Durham, fifty miles away. The day after that, students at Fayetteville State Teachers College and at Johnson C. Smith College, in Charlotte, joined in, followed on Wednesday by students at St. Augustine’s College and Shaw University, in Raleigh. On Thursday and Friday, the protest crossed state lines, surfacing in Hampton and Portsmouth, Virginia, in Rock Hill, South Carolina, and in Chattanooga, Tennessee. By the end of the month, there were sit-ins throughout the South, as far west as Texas. “I asked every student I met what the first day of the sitdowns had been like on his campus,” the political theorist Michael Walzer wrote in Dissent. “The answer was always the same: ‘It was like a fever. Everyone wanted to go.’ ” Some seventy thousand students eventually took part. Thousands were arrested and untold thousands more radicalized. These events in the early sixties became a civil-rights war that engulfed the South for the rest of the decade—and it happened without e-mail, texting, Facebook, or Twitter.Why the revolution will not be tweeted.
by Malcolm GladwellOCTOBER 4, 2010

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This being Christmas (at least for those who didn’t get coal in their stockings), it seemed like a fine time to revisit the leverage debate. We here at The Scrambler thought this was just the moment to return to our occasional series/tongue in cheek hashtag, GREAT MOMENTS IN BANKING HISTORY.
The Baseline Scenario had a great piece a little while back by Anat Admati (she teaches Finance I, among other things at the Stanford GSB). She responds to a long NYTMag article on Jamie Dimon and his assertion that JPMorgan should continue to grow. She also dismantles the larger issue of the cost of capital for the street. It’s riveting. Basically, her argument is that debt financing has made it too cheap for the banks to operate (ie, they don’t fully internalize their costs to society and risk to investors alike due to their heavy reliance on leverage/debt financing). If they moved more towards equity, we’d all be better off (or at least, less likely to suffer another cataclysmic meltdown). Excerpt from the piece below. Click the link here for the full Baseline Scenario. Her article is based on a longer working paper put out last October (the full paper is Scribd below). Print this one out and enjoy with your lunch. If you took a low blow (or some long-dated shares) last week, you could use it to wipe away your tears. But it’s really fascinating. Read it before turning it into Kleenex…
What Jamie Dimon Won’t Tell You: His Big Bank Would Be Dangerously Leveraged
By Anat Admati, Professor of Finance and Economics at Stanford Graduate School of Business. To see her explain these issues in person, watch this Bloomberg interview. This is a long post, about 3,500 words.
The debate is raging about banks and their size, financial regulation, and the international capital standards known as “Basel”. Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan Chase, in his New York Times magazine profile, expresses admiration for the Basel committee and says,
“… they are asking the questions that, in theory, bankers ask of themselves: how much capital do banks need to withstand the inevitable downturn, and what is an acceptable level of risk?”
There is one problem, however. Basel may have asked the right question, but it did not come up with the right answers, mainly because it allows banks to remain dangerously leveraged, setting equity requirements way too low. This fact is not understood because the debate on capital regulation has been mired with a cloud of confusion, and filled with un-substantiated assertions by bankers and others. As a result, the issues appear much more mysterious and complicated than they actually are.
After a massive and incredibly costly financial crisis, we seem to have financial system that is a more consolidated, more powerful, more profitable and, yes, as fragile and dangerous as we had before the crisis. How did this happen and what can we do?
Here are some questions on which the confusion is staggering.
(i) Is “too big” the same as “too big to fail?”
(ii) Do capital requirements force banks to “set capital aside for a rainy day” and not use it to help the economy grow?
(iii) Are banks different than non-banks in that high leverage is essential to banks’ ability to function?
(iv) Would terrible things happen if capital requirements were to increase dramatically?
The first order of business is to clear the fog and focus on the right things. I will try to explain. With the basics in place, answers will begin to emerge, or at least the right questions to ask.
By the way, I answer an emphatic NO to each of the above questions.

Major props to longtime reader and contributor Adam. Dr. K (not to be confused with Dr. Lou) presents a refereed paper breaking down the latest news from Stanford Football- new head coach David Shaw. Insightful analysis on the press conference, the hiring, the immediate future, and the long term. Print this thing out and enjoy w/your lunch.
The whole this is excellent. Full Scribd version below. A few key passages…..
As a Stanford fan, I could not be happier with Coach Shaw’s comments. It also appeared that Bowlsby, who has a history of fantastic hires at Iowa and Stanford, is quite confident in this move. Of course, when selecting from mutually exclusive choices, an opportunity cost always exists.
As I see it, Bowlsby was looking for three things in the next head coach.
1. The ability to win in the short-term.
Let’s not kid ourselves – 2011 represents a golden, perhaps singular opportunity for Stanford football. Andrew Luck appears to be a once-in-a-generation talent, not just for our program but for the entire sport. He is surrounded by playmakers on offense, and we return many of the most important cogs of a dramatically improved defense. As fate would have it, Stanford’s status appears to be at an all-time high. It is crucial that the program maintains both the culture of success and the schemes that have produced 20 wins the past two seasons. The best way to do that was to hire internally……
2. The ability to win in the long-term.
There are a few components to this. First, the ability to recruit effectively. This is no small feat at Stanford, where a national view, effective communication with admissions, and the right sales pitch to high school kids and their parents are key. Shaw has contributed significantly to the outstanding classes brought in over the past few years, and appears equipped to continue that success…..
3. The ability to win the Stanford way.
Stanford is unlike any other athletic department. Nobody does so much winning: 100 national titles and 16 consecutive Directors’ Cups. However, it’s also true that nobody even close to this level of success places such tremendous pressure on its coaches to recruit student-athletes who can succeed at the university, keep them out of trouble, and ensure that they graduate. The football program finally has the top-down support necessary to build a consistent winner, but this is entirely contingent on continuing to run a clean program with players who do not embarrass the university…
Bowlsby clearly believed Shaw was the best man to meet criteria 1-3. Either way, the Stanford community will look back on this defining moment for years to come. Here’s hoping the sentiment is overwhelmingly positive.
Looking ahead, plan on a thorough recruiting synopsis in mid-February and a recap of spring practices sometime in April or May.
GO CARD!
David Shaw And The Future Of Stanford Football
#readeranalysis is back in business. Send your stuff in (submit, on the left bar) and if you make the cut, you’re front page on The Scrambler.
From Sunday’s NYTMag. Maybe we’re in the wrong business…

A shopkeeper in Italy placed an order with a Chinese sneaker factory in Putian for 3,000 pairs of white Nike Tiempo indoor soccer shoes. It was early February, and the shopkeeper wanted the Tiempos pronto. Neither he nor Lin, the factory manager, were authorized to make Nikes. They would have no blueprints or instructions to follow. But Lin didn’t mind. He was used to working from scratch. A week later, Lin, who asked that I only use his first name, received a pair of authentic Tiempos, took them apart, studied their stitching and molding, drew up his own design and oversaw the production of 3,000 Nike clones. A month later, he shipped the shoes to Italy. “He’ll order more when there’s none left,” Lin told me recently, with confidence.
Lin has spent most of his adult life making sneakers, though he only entered the counterfeit business about five years ago. “What we make depends on the order,” Lin said. “But if someone wants Nikes, we’ll make them Nikes.” Putian, a “nest” for counterfeit-sneaker manufacturing, as one China-based intellectual-property lawyer put it, is in the southeastern Chinese province of Fujian, just across the strait from Taiwan. In the late 1980s, multinational companies from all industries started outsourcing production to factories in the coastal provinces of Fujian, Guangdong and Zhejiang. Industries tended to cluster in specific cities and subregions. For Putian, it was sneakers. By the mid-1990s, a new brand of factory, specializing in fakes, began copying authentic Nike, Adidas, Puma and Reebok shoes. Counterfeiters played a low-budget game of industrial espionage, bribing employees at the licensed factories to lift samples or copy blueprints. Shoes were even chucked over a factory wall, according to a worker at one of Nike’s Putian factories. It wasn’t unusual for counterfeit models to show up in stores before the real ones did.
“There’s no way to get inside anymore,” Lin told me, describing the enhanced security measures at the licensed factories: guards, cameras and secondary outer walls. “Now we just go to a shop that sells the real shoes, buy a pair from the store and duplicate them.” Counterfeits come in varying levels of quality depending on their intended market. Shoes from Putian are designed primarily for export, and in corporate-footwear and intellectual-property-rights circles, Putian has become synonymous with high-end fakes, shoes so sophisticated that it is difficult to distinguish the real ones from the counterfeits.
In the last fiscal year, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized more than $260 million worth of counterfeit goods. The goods included counterfeit Snuggies, DVDs, brake pads, computer parts and baby formula. But for four years, counterfeit footwear has topped the seizure list of the customs service; in the last fiscal year it accounted for nearly 40 percent of total seizures. (Electronics made up the second-largest share in that year, with about 12 percent of the total.) The customs service doesn’t break down seizures by brand, but demand for the fake reflects demand for the real, and Nike is widely considered to be the most counterfeited brand. One Nike employee estimated that there was one fake Nike item for every two authentic ones. But Peter Koehler, Nike’s global counsel for brand and litigation, told me that “counting the number of counterfeits is frankly impossible.”

Stumbled upon this awesome profile of Mitt Romney at the Boston Globe. They basically take apart his life. Whatever you you think of his politics now (for instance, a charlatan willing to abandon all the moderate positions he held to win a hard right GOP’s 2012 nomination), his career is business is unbelievable.
Mitt Romney gets buckets.
On a winter’s evening in 1985, Mitt Romney sat in a drab 10-by-10-foot conference room in Boston’s Copley Place, flapping his tie to mimic a rapidly beating heart. His colleagues knew that when Romney flapped his tie, it meant he was under pressure. Lately, the young businessman had been feeling it like never before.
The pressure had been building ever since he’d been tapped by his mentor to create and run an investment firm called Bain Capital. But two years after Romney took the job, and more than a year after he officially launched the firm, Bain Capital had yet to make many investments. And the few it had made were foundering.
Sitting in the conference room, Romney was so worried about the start-up’s future that, according to one colleague, he raised the possibility of just returning the millions they had raised from investors and going back to their old jobs.
Dressed in a crisp blue shirt, with a white collar and gold collar-pin, Romney appeared to be the model of a successful young financier, with one exception. His shirt, according to colleague Geoffrey Rehnert, was drenched dark with sweat under his arms.
”Mitt was struggling,” Rehnert says. ”And he wasn’t used to struggling.”
In time, Romney would lead the shaky start-up from a staff of seven people managing $37 million to 115 people managing $4 billion in assets. During Romney’s 15-year tenure, Bain Capital would post an astonishing record, on average doubling its return on realized investments every year. Thomas H. Lee, founder of cross-town rival Thomas H. Lee Partners, calls the company’s performance under Romney ”one of the great stories of American capital.”
Romney would eventually use his business success as a platform for his political campaigns, stressing his leadership skills and data-driven management acumen. His critics would use his work in this little-understood world of private equity to paint him as a coldhearted profiteer, cutting jobs to line his own pockets.
But there would never be any argument about how perfectly Mitt Romney fit the image of the smooth and supremely confident executive, with never a hair out of place. Privately, his colleagues knew differently.
On his way to the top, Rehnert says, Romney sweat his way through the underarms of so many shirts that his colleagues came up with a term for it: ”pitting.”
Click the link above to this section of the profile. It runs from his Harvard JD/MBA in 1971 to his departure to run the Salt Lake Olympic Committee in 1999.
SF Lunchtime read……
“The malaria parasite has been responsible for half of all human deaths since the Stone Age” is the quote that jumped off the page in a recent article by Sonia Shah in the Wall Street Journal.
Entitled “The Tenacious Buzz of Malaria” the article places malaria in a long term perspective.
Malaria has shaped our trade and settlement patterns, and our demographics. Today, it sickens 300 million every year, and kills nearly 1 million, despite the fact that we’ve known how to cure it (with parasite-killing drugs) and prevent it (by avoiding mosquito bites) for over a century. And even as the fight against malaria gains momentum, research reveals that malaria’s tentacles continue to dig ever deeper.
Part of malaria’s wicked genius is that since ancient times, it has fooled us into thinking it is a trivial problem, easily solved. Diseases such as yellow fever, or plague, or polio, have always filled us with dread. But not malaria. Almost all of our attempts to squelch it, from thousands of years ago to today, have treated the disease as a weak foe, allowing malaria to flourish, nearly unchecked, to this day.
From low tech solutions like bed nets to high tech lasers that shoot mosquitoes in mid air, and many international programs against malaria and the development of a vaccine, humans continue to work to fight the disease. But as the article states, “We’ve all been underestimating malaria for millennia.”
Sonia Shah is the author of a newly published book, The Fever: How Malaria Has Ruled Humankind for 500,000 Years.
Pretty deep. Gawande brings the hot fire. This piece will take you awhile to read through, asks a lot of tough questions that we’ll have to answer as a society moving forward. Enjoy your lunch.

Modern medicine is good at staving off death with aggressive interventions—and bad at knowing when to focus, instead, on improving the days that terminal patients have left.
This is the moment in Sara’s story that poses a fundamental question for everyone living in the era of modern medicine: What do we want Sara and her doctors to do now? Or, to put it another way, if you were the one who had metastatic cancer—or, for that matter, a similarly advanced case of emphysema or congestive heart failure—what would you want your doctors to do?
The issue has become pressing, in recent years, for reasons of expense. The soaring cost of health care is the greatest threat to the country’s long-term solvency, and the terminally ill account for a lot of it. Twenty-five per cent of all Medicare spending is for the five per cent of patients who are in their final year of life, and most of that money goes for care in their last couple of months which is of little apparent benefit.
Spending on a disease like cancer tends to follow a particular pattern. There are high initial costs as the cancer is treated, and then, if all goes well, these costs taper off. Medical spending for a breast-cancer survivor, for instance, averaged an estimated fifty-four thousand dollars in 2003, the vast majority of it for the initial diagnostic testing, surgery, and, where necessary, radiation and chemotherapy. For a patient with a fatal version of the disease, though, the cost curve is U-shaped, rising again toward the end—to an average of sixty-three thousand dollars during the last six months of life with an incurable breast cancer. Our medical system is excellent at trying to stave off death with eight-thousand-dollar-a-month chemotherapy, three-thousand-dollar-a-day intensive care, five-thousand-dollar-an-hour surgery. But, ultimately, death comes, and no one is good at knowing when to stop.
The subject seems to reach national awareness mainly as a question of who should “win” when the expensive decisions are made: the insurers and the taxpayers footing the bill or the patient battling for his or her life. Budget hawks urge us to face the fact that we can’t afford everything. Demagogues shout about rationing and death panels. Market purists blame the existence of insurance: if patients and families paid the bills themselves, those expensive therapies would all come down in price. But they’re debating the wrong question. The failure of our system of medical care for people facing the end of their life runs much deeper. To see this, you have to get close enough to grapple with the way decisions about care are actually made.
Hmmmm…….
Needless to say, I’m really liking The Stone blog over at NYT. Excerpt below.

You arrive at a bakery. It’s the evening of a national holiday. You want to buy a cake with your last 10 dollars to round off the preparations you’ve already made. There’s only one thing left in the store — a 10-dollar cake.
On the steps of the store, someone is shaking an Oxfam tin. You stop, and it seems quite clear to you — it surely is quite clear to you — that it is entirely up to you what you do next. You are — it seems — truly, radically, ultimately free to choose what to do, in such a way that you will be ultimately morally responsible for whatever you do choose. Fact: you can put the money in the tin, or you can go in and buy the cake. You’re not only completely, radically free to choose in this situation. You’re not free not to choose (that’s how it feels). You’re “condemned to freedom,” in Jean-Paul Sartre’s phrase. You’re fully and explicitly conscious of what the options are and you can’t escape that consciousness. You can’t somehow slip out of it.
You may have heard of determinism, the theory that absolutely everything that happens is causally determined to happen exactly as it does by what has already gone before — right back to the beginning of the universe. You may also believe that determinism is true. (You may also know, contrary to popular opinion, that current science gives us no more reason to think that determinism is false than that determinism is true.) In that case, standing on the steps of the store, it may cross your mind that in five minutes’ time you’ll be able to look back on the situation you’re in now and say truly, of what you will by then have done, “Well, it was determined that I should do that.” But even if you do fervently believe this, it doesn’t seem to be able to touch your sense that you’re absolutely morally responsible for what you next.
The case of the Oxfam box, which I have used before to illustrate this problem, is relatively dramatic, but choices of this type are common. They occur frequently in our everyday lives, and they seem to prove beyond a doubt that we are free and ultimately morally responsible for what we do. There is, however, an argument, which I call the Basic Argument, which appears to show that we can never be ultimately morally responsible for our actions. According to the Basic Argument, it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false. We can’t be ultimately morally responsible either way.
The argument goes like this.
(1) You do what you do — in the circumstances in which you find yourself—because of the way you then are.
(2) So if you’re going to be ultimately responsible for what you do, you’re going to have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are — at least in certain mental respects.
(3) But you can’t be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
(4) So you can’t be ultimately responsible for what you do.
The key move is (3). Why can’t you be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all? In answer, consider an expanded version of the argument.
(a) It’s undeniable that the way you are initially is a result of your genetic inheritance and early experience.
(b) It’s undeniable that these are things for which you can’t be held to be in any way responsible (morally or otherwise).
(c) But you can’t at any later stage of life hope to acquire true or ultimate moral responsibility for the way one you are by trying to change the way you already are as a result of genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(d) Why not? Because both the particular ways in which you try to change yourself, and the amount of success you have when trying to change yourself, will be determined by how you already are as a result of your genetic inheritance and previous experience.
(e) And any further changes that you may become able to bring about after you have brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by your genetic inheritance and previous experience.